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ABSTRACT
Loyalty programs are important tools for sharing platforms seeking
to grow supply. Online sharing platforms use loyalty programs
to heavily subsidize resource providers, encouraging participation
and boosting supply. As the sharing economy has evolved and
competition has increased, the design of loyalty programs has be-
gun to play a crucial role in the pursuit of maximal revenue. In
this paper, we first characterize the optimal loyalty program for
a platform with homogeneous users. We then show that optimal
revenue in a heterogeneous market can be achieved by a class of
multi-threshold loyalty program (MTLP) which admits a simple
implementation-friendly structure. We also study the performance
of loyalty programs in a setting with two competing sharing plat-
forms, showing that the degree of heterogeneity is a crucial factor
for both loyalty programs and pricing strategies. Our results show
that sophisticated loyalty programs that reward suppliers via step-
wise linear functions outperform simple sign-up bonuses, which
give them a one time reward for participating.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, the sharing economy has upended a wide variety
of industries, from bike sharing and car sharing to food delivery
and hotels. However, despite the rapid rise and success of online
sharing platforms, there is much about their design and operation
yet to be understood. Our lack of understanding is made clear by the
fact that competing sharing platforms in the same space often have
fundamentally different approaches to pricing, matching, subsidies,
market positioning, etc. The contrast between Uber, Lyft, and Didi
with respect to pricing and market positioning in the context of
ridesharing is a particularly salient example, e.g., [8, 25].
As a result, the design and operation of sharing platforms has
emerged as a lively and growing research area, with papers fo-
cused on efficiency in matching [1, 33], pricing strategies [3, 6],
equilibrium analysis [6, 17], empirical studies [11, 12], and more.
In this paper, our focus is on the task of designing subsidies, a.k.a.,
loyalty programs within sharing platforms. Subsidies play a crucial
role in sharing platforms because they help to ensure that there is
enough shared capacity in order to meet the demand. For example,
in the context of ridesharing, various forms of loyalty programs for
drivers have been in place since the beginning of the industry, e.g.,
[8, 18]. In addition to ensuring enough shared capacity is present
in the system, loyalty programs play another important role in
sharing platforms too. They are crucial tools when competing for
and retaining sharing capacity. For example, in the case of rideshar-
ing, loyalty programs allow Uber and Lyft to lock-in drivers on one
platform; thus both increasing the platform capacity and decreasing
the capacity of competing platforms [30].
The importance of these loyalty programs cannot be overstated
– maintaining capacity is the fundamental challenge of a sharing
platform. Thus, it is not surprising that they have become increas-
ingly sophisticated as competition has heated up in the industry.
In ridesharing, Uber and Lyft both began with simply offering a
one-time reward, called a sign-up bonus, to new drivers. However,
loyalty programs have become considerably more complex and
expensive as the industry has evolved. Uber and Lyft both recently
introduced loyalty programs to reward drivers after they reach
certain trip milestones, i.e., drivers earn a “power driver” bonus
after a minimum service requirement is reached. Indeed, platforms
depend so much on these loyalty programs that they are willing
to invest heavily in them. The cost of paying subsidies to boost
supply and win market share is huge, e.g., Didi spends in excess of
$4 billion annually on subsidizing drivers [18].
Motivated by the importance of loyalty programs for sharing
platforms, the goal of this paper is to study the optimal design of
loyalty programs for sharing platforms and to understand the com-
petitive advantage provided by moving toward more sophisticated
loyalty programs.
While we are motivated by ridesharing, our focus is on sharing
platforms more broadly. Thus, we build our work on classical mod-
els of two-sided platforms in economics [28, 29, 34]. Specifically,
we first consider the case when the platform has monopoly in a
market with homogeneous product owners. We show that the opti-
mal revenue can be achieved with a linear loyalty program (LLP)
with a form similar to the “power driver” program used in practice.
We then consider the heterogeneous market. In this case, however,
finding the optimal loyalty program can be intractable as it requires
searching over complex subsidy functions. Moreover, the resulting
program may be impractical due to its complex structure. To tackle
this problem, we prove that the optimal revenue can be achieved
by a much simpler class of multi-threshold linear loyalty programs
(MTLP). Moreover, compared to a general loyalty program which
may be impractical, the form of MTLP facilitates implementation
in practice. This significantly reduces the required search space.
We further design a special MTLP program called a Hyperbolic
Bonus (HB), which admits a simple hyperbolic bonus structure and
is cost-efficient, in that it pays the necessary opportunity cost plus
a constant regardless of the size of the market.
Our results highlight that the design of the optimal linear loyalty
program has the property that it no longer extracts any commission
fee when product owners have shared more than some required
amount. This property mimics the design of Lyft’s power driver
program [7].
Further, we consider loyalty program design under competition.
Specifically, we study a setting in which two platforms compete for
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the scarce supply (shared capacity) with the objective of maximizing
revenue. Within this context, we conduct a comparative study of
one-time sign-up bonuses and linear loyalty programs, in order
to investigate the impact of the relative sophistication of loyalty
programs on competition between the firms. Our results show that
sophisticated loyalty programs that reward suppliers via stepwise
linear functions provide a meaningful competitive advantage over
simple sign-up bonuses, which give them a one time reward for
participating.
Moreover, we show that the heterogeneity of suppliers plays a
critical role in deciding the optimal loyalty program used by plat-
forms. This is important because suppliers in the sharing economy
tend to exhibit significant heterogeneity in engagement. For in-
stance, it has been reported that there exist two different clusters
of active drivers on Uber platform [20], where the highly active
group members have nearly 6 times longer driving time than low
activity group members four months after their registration. This
heterogeneity has a fundamental impact on platforms’ strategies,
both in a monopolistic or competitive market. When a platform has
monopoly, introducing a more complicated ladder-like progressive
bonus can extract more revenue from heterogeneous suppliers.
While in a competitive heterogeneous market, platforms com-
pete through the design of loyalty programs and can counter the
“winner take all” phenomenon, which is known to be prominent
in competition between platforms from classic two-sided market
theory, e.g., [29]. Intuitively, if users are homogeneous, platforms
may try to attract all users and obtain higher revenue. This results
in a classic “winner take all” situation since, e.g., the more users
a platform has the more desirable it is for drivers, and vice versa.
On the other hand, if users are highly differentiated, the aggressive
strategy of capturing the whole market can become too expen-
sive. In this case, it is wiser for platforms to focus only on distinct
user groups. This creates an opportunity for firms to be strategic
about market positioning and may yield situations where multiple
platforms can survive, avoiding a “winner take all” scenario.
Contributions of this paper. In summary, this paper makes
the following contributions.
First, this paper introduces a novel model to study subsidy pro-
gram of a sharing platform, which is widely adopted in real world
to overcome supply shortage. Our model is built on classical two-
sided market models, but it captures the fact that suppliers can now
benefit from using the resources for their own purposes. It also
captures supplier heterogeneity in self-usage values. Further, the
model allows the study of competition between platforms.
Second, we prove that a linear loyalty program (LLP) maximizes
revenue over all possible loyalty programs in a market with homo-
geneous suppliers, and we characterize the optimal linear loyalty
program design. For markets with heterogeneous suppliers, we
establish that optimal revenue can be achieved using a set of multi-
threshold linear loyalty programs (MTLP) that have a simple bonus
structure and are implementation-friendly. We further exploit the
structure of MTLP and design an MTLP called Hyperbolic Bonus
(HB), which admits a very simple bonus form and is cost-efficient.
Third, we further consider loyalty program design under compe-
tition.We conduct a comparative study of one-time sign-up bonuses
and linear loyalty programs, in order to investigate the impact of
the relative sophistication of loyalty programs on competition be-
tween the firms. Our findings can be used to explain the fact that
Uber and Lyft initially introduced sign-up bonuses to attract driver
registration, but have later shifted to using ladder-like linear loyalty
programs [7].
Fourth, we show that supplier heterogeneity has a dramatic im-
pact on the market, e.g., on both the platform’s pricing strategy and
market positioning strategy. Our findings can be used to explain
why Uber and Lyft adopt different market positioning strategies to
attract drivers and riders [9, 25].
Finally, to validate analytic results, we conduct a simulation
using utility functions derived from Didi’s transaction data, which
is reported in [17]. Our results show that multi-threshold loyalty
program achieves near-optimal revenue in heterogeneous markets,
and that linear loyalty programs achieve higher revenue than sign-
up bonuses, and they are more robust to supplier heterogeneity.
Related literature. A large and growing literature studying
the sharing economy has emerged in recent years. These works
focus on a wide variety of issues from efficiency in matching [1,
33], pricing strategies [3, 6], equilibrium analysis [6, 17], empirical
studies [11, 12], and more.
At this point, existing empirical studies have been able to shed
considerable light on the behavior of consumers in sharing plat-
forms. These studies inform the modeling choices we make in this
paper. For example, [13] estimates user surplus from demand data
under different surge prices, [11] studies Uber’s dynamic pricing
strategies by collected API data from San Francisco and Manhattan,
and shows that demand is muchmore sensitive to transaction prices
compared to supply capacity. Similar studies exist for other sharing
platforms. In the case of Airbnb, [22, 26] study Airbnb’s revenue
and occupancy by crawling listing data from the website, and [35]
estimates the impact of Airbnb on the hotel industry.
The current paper fits into the growing literature that uses ana-
lytic models to study and optimize the design of sharing platforms,
e.g., see [28, 29, 34] and related references for an overview. Such
papers focus on two-sided market models where both sides in the
market benefit from the participation of the other side, and plat-
forms set prices to maximize transaction volumes, defined as the
product of population sizes on both sides. Within this literature,
some papers focus specifically on the pricing and subsidy strategies
for sharing platforms. These are the most related to this paper.
Most such papers focus on optimizing the pricing strategy of a
monopolistic platform. For example, [17] shows that subsidizing
product owners can substantially increase supply and, hence, in-
crease social welfare. Similarly, [6] studies the pricing strategies to
achieve optimal revenue and social welfare. Other highlights from
the literature on pricing in a single platform are [5], which shows
that dynamic pricing is more robust than static pricing in the con-
text of ride sharing; [10], which shows that fixed ratio commission
is nearly optimal for platforms and dynamic pricing helps increase
social welfare; and [31], which provides an approach to approx-
imately optimize revenue, throughput and welfare for a sharing
platform based on a Markov model.
There is far less work studying competition between platforms.
The most prominent examples are [2, 27], which show that it is in
the best interest of platforms to compete for users who are single-
homing in order to attract loyal users. These papers highlight the
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importance of considering supplier heterogeneity when studying
competition between platforms, but leave open the question of how
to design subsidies to attract and retain suppliers.
The importance of capturing user heterogeneity is also empha-
sized by [4], which considers a model where buyers and sellers
are segmented by their characteristics and proposes an algorithm
for platforms to control the visibility among segmented groups to
achieve approximated optimal revenue. The degree of heterogene-
ity is also an important feature in empirical studies, e.g., [20] shows
that Uber users are highly differentiated in various aspects.
In summary, there is a growing literature of analytic work study-
ing pricing and subsidization in platforms. This work has high-
lighted the importance of modeling consumer heterogeneity, and
proposed explicit optimal subsidy strategy for practical use. It has
also showed the performance of subsidy programs in the compe-
tition between two sharing platforms, but has only scratched the
surface in understanding how subsidies and competition impact
revenue of a sharing platform. Our paper is the first to characterize
optimal subsidization and to look at competition that is driven by
subsidies.
2 MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
The goal of this paper is to study the loyalty programs in sharing
platforms, focusing on the most common case when supply is in-
sufficient and loyalty programs are necessary to attract and retain
supply. To facilitate understanding, we first describe our model for
a monopolistic market in this section. Then, we analyze this market
in Section 3. After that, we extend the results to study competition
between two platforms in Section 4. All the proofs of our results in
this paper are in appendix.
2.1 Demand and supply
In ourmodel, demand comes from product renters and supply comes
from product owners. The total demand is denoted by D(q), where
q is the renting price that the platform charges for per unit demand.
For example, demand can be ride requests or apartment rental or-
ders. Assume that D(q) is decreasing in q, and q ∈ [qmin ,qmax ]. In
our model, demand is considered to be a function of price. Quan-
titative case studies [21, 23] have been conducted to show that
economic benefit (maximize economic gain and save money) is the
determinant of user’s decision and behavior in the sharing econ-
omy, under different services such as bike sharing, car sharing and
accommodation sharing. Take the car hailing market for example,
empirical studies show that renters are primarily sensitive to price
[11], and wait time does not have major impact on passenger’s
behavior given real world ETA data [17].
In our paper, we will assume that q is fixed, and focus on the
optimal price and subsidy program on owners. The reason is that
we consider the long-term average effect of pricing and user partici-
pation. This style of model has become popular in recent years since
it separates design issues associated with dynamics from the under-
lying economic competition between platforms, e.g., [6, 19]. This
assumption captures a platform’s limitation in pricing in reality.
Though renter price fluctuates in real time (dynamic pricing), the
long-term average is relatively stable. For instance, in the context of
ride sharing, passengers are highly price sensitive [17], so platform
Pay
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Figure 1: Platform charges renter q for per unit demand, and
pays suppliers p for per unit sharing. Extra subsidies are
paid to active suppliers to incentivize more sharing.
has to maintain a stable and reasonable ride price to attract and
retain customers. Further, the price of substitute services also limits
the pricing power of the sharing platform, e.g., Uber tries to beat
taxi fare a little bit in many cities [32]. In fact, the passenger prices
for UberX in London have stayed the same for the last two years,
while prices in New York have only been changed once in the last
two years.1
We denote the set of suppliers by O. Since we focus on the
case when supply is insufficient, we assume that D(q) > |O| for
q ∈ [qmin ,qmax ]. For each user i ∈ O, we normalize his total
resource to be 1 unit, and assume that he can divide the allocation
of his resources into two parts: self-usage xi ∈ [0, 1] and sharing
on platform si ∈ [0, 1]. Note that xi + si ≤ 1. Thus, the total supply
on the platforms is:
S =
∑
i ∈O
si
To determine each owner’s sharing level si , we model each prod-
uct owner’s utility as the sum of two different components: (i) utility
derived from self-usage of the product, and (ii) income earned from
sharing the product through the platform.
We denote fi (xi ) the self-usage utility. Note that each owner’s
fi (xi ) is not revealed to others, and it is defined on [0, 1]. In this pa-
per, we assume that each owner’s utility function fi (xi ) is concave
increasing and differentiable on [0, 1]. This assumption guarantees
full utilization of resources, i.e., xi + si = 1. Denote p the per unit
sharing price the platform offers to owners. We also assume that
f ′i (1) = 0 and f ′i (0) > p. This ensures that self-usage is not a trivial
option for product owners. Therefore, the overall utility of owner i
is given by:
Ui = fi (xi ) + psi . (1)
Each owner chooses his xi and si values to maximize his utility (1).
In the two-sided market literature, owner utility in (1) often
takes the formUi = fi (xi ) + pmin{1,D/S}si , to take into account
product utilization, e.g., [10, 14, 17]. In our case, since optimal
loyalty programs are primarily needed when supply is insufficient,
we assume without loss of generality that min{1,D/S} = 1 in this
paper.2
1See http://uberestimate.com/prices/New-York-City/all/ for price change log in New
York City.
2For the situation when supply is sufficient, there is no need for loyalty programs or
other promotions for suppliers. Platforms can achieve maximum revenue by choosing
optimal prices [6, 17].
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2.2 Platform price and revenue
In practice, platforms usually extract a commission fee, i.e., a fixed
percentage of each ride’s value. We define the commission fee β ≥ 0
and conveniently write
q = (1 + β) · p (2)
Recall that q is the service price to renters and p is the payment to
owners for per unit resource sharing. Revenue is the profit from
the gap of the income from renters and payment to owners.
However, supply shortage has been shown to prevent a platform
from obtaining the maximum revenue since many renter orders
are not fulfilled [17]. Thus, in practice, a common strategy used
by sharing platforms to overcome this challenge is to subsidize
resource providers. Yet, despite the wide adoption of subsidy pro-
grams, it still remains to understand how to design an optimal
subsidy program.
To carry out our study on optimal subsidies, we first introduce a
general definition for a subsidy program. A subsidy program gives
owner i a bonusW (si ) ≥ 0 according to his sharing level si . Note
thatW (si ) is a non-decreasing function. It is clear that a subsidy
program impacts a platform’s revenue, since the platform has to pay
its suppliers an additional amount for their sharing. To take this into
account when analyzing platform revenue, we define platform’s
revenue as:
R = (q − p)S −
∑
i
W (si ), (3)
where
∑
iW (si ) is the total subsidies paid to owners. For notational
convenience, we define B(s) to be the marginal bonus, i.e.,
W (si ) =
∫ si
0
B(s)ds . (4)
2.3 Heterogeneous suppliers
Heterogeneity is a fundamental issue for sharing platforms, as
we have highlighted in the introduction. To model heterogeneous
suppliers, we consider n different classes of owners in the market
with self-usage utility functions fi (xi ), i ∈ {1, 2, ...,n}. To simplify
the analysis, we represent each class as one owner, and use owner
i to refer to owners in class i for simplicity. This is for convenience
and is without loss of generality. All of our results can be extended
to the case when there are arbitrary number of owners in each class.
We assume that any two classes of users are highly differentiated.
Specifically, we assume that f ′1 (x) > f ′2 (x) > ... > f ′n (x), for
x ∈ [0, 1]. This assumption is natural given that empirical studies
have shown marked differentiation between users [20].
3 SUBSIDIES IN A MONOPOLISTIC MARKET
We begin our analysis with the study of a monopolistic platform.
Our main result in this section is that maximal revenue can be
achieved in both homogeneous and heterogeneous markets. In the
homogeneous market we show that linear loyalty programs are
optimal while in heterogeneous markets we show that multi-level
threshold programs are optimal. Finally, we also introduce a novel
form of subsidies, hyperbolic bonuses, that are cost-efficient and
easy to determine.
3.1 Homogeneous markets
In this subsection we show that linear loyalty programs achieve
maximal revenue across any general forms of loyalty programwhen
suppliers are homogeneous. Linear loyalty programs are defined as
follows.
Definition 3.1. A linear loyalty program (LLP) is a subsidy
program under which the platform pays owners an extra bonus B for
per unit sharing, in addition to the base pay p, to those who share
higher than some threshold t . Under a linear loyalty program, the
utility of owner i is:
Ui = fi (xi ) + psi + B(si − t)+, (5)
where (si − t)+ = max{si − t , 0}.
The following theorem summarizes the optimal bonus volume,
service threshold and revenue obtained under linear loyalty pro-
grams.
Theorem 3.2. Given homogeneous owners, i.e., fi (x) = f (x) for
all i ∈ O, and platform’s prices on supply and demand, i.e., p and q,
the following loyalty program achieves the maximum revenue over
all subsidy programs in a monopoly market:
B∗ = q − p,
t∗ = s − f (1 − s0) − f (1 − s) − p(s − s0)
q − p . (6)
Here s and s0 satisfying f ′(1−s) = q and f ′(1−s0) = p are the owner
sharing levels with and without the loyalty program, respectively.
Moreover, the maximum revenue that the platform obtains is:
R∗ = B∗ · t∗. (7)
The meaning of above B∗ and t∗ is that the platform should boost
supply by returning all revenue to owners who meet the minimum
sharing requirement, e.g., extract no commission fee for drivers who
have reached a certain trip milestone on the platform. This parallels
the current design of Lyft’s power driver program [7].
The theorem is proved in two steps. The first step is to show the
optimality of the linear loyalty program among all possible forms
of loyalty program. We prove that linear loyalty program at least
achieves the same revenue as any general loyalty program. The
second step is to compute the optimal bonus, which turns out to be
exactly the price gap between q and p. Interestingly, the optimal
bonus B∗ = q − p is independent of the form of function f (x).
The intuition behind this surprisingly simple form of the optimal
subsidy program is that, this linear form of loyalty program can
exactly cover owner’s opportunity cost for one to increase sharing
amount, i.e., barely compensate for the lost of self-usage benefit, in
order to maximize platform revenue.
With Theorem 3.2, we can further compute the optimal supply
price p and the corresponding platform revenue below.
Corollary 3.3. Given homogeneous owners and fixed demand
price q, the maximum platform revenue is achieved by letting
p = 0,
B = q,
t = s − 1
q
(f (1) − f (1 − s)), (8)
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Figure 2: Optimal linear loyalty program pays owners B = q
for per unit sharing after his sharing level exceeds threshold
t . Owner’s optimal sharing s will be at the intersection point
of f ′(x) = B, where the marginal benefits of self-usage and
sharing are equal.
where owner’s sharing level s satisfies f ′(1 − s) = q.
Interestingly, this Corollary 3.3 shows that the optimal supply
price p is zero. That is to say, it is the platform’s optimal strategy
to pay owners nothing unless they share more than some given
threshold. From the above, we see that the platform should pay
owners exactly the amount to cover their opportunity cost of using
the resources themselves (users will start to share only when the
marginal benefit of self-usage is lower thanp+B). Therefore, setting
p = 0 gives the minimum opportunity cost of owners. Figure 2
shows an optimal linear loyalty program.
Note that this result extends to the case when owners have linear
usage/sharing cost, e.g., gas, taxation [16]. In this case, the optimal
owner pricep in Corollary 3.3 should be the price that exactly equals
the cost per unit sharing, leaving no extra revenue for owners who
share less than the threshold t .
3.2 Heterogeneous markets
We now turn to the case when owners are heterogeneous. Re-
call that for the n owners, we have f ′1 (x) > f ′2 (x) > ... > f ′n (x),
for x ∈ [0, 1]. We first introduce a result describing the owners’
participation in loyalty program, given the marginal bonus B(s)
non-decreasing.
Proposition 3.4. Under a loyalty program with non-decreasing
marginal bonus B(s), if owner i benefits from participating in the
loyalty program, i.e., he increases his sharing level compared to the
amount without loyalty program, all owners j > i will also participate
in the loyalty program B(s) and boost sharing.
The intuition of the above result is that if owner i thinks that it is
more profitable to share more, other owners j > i will also increase
sharing since they have even lower self-usage benefits and hence
lower opportunity costs. Thus, the platform can choose a loyalty
program such that all owners j > i0 participate. Without loss of
generality, we only consider loyalty programs that all n owners will
participate in this paper to simplify the presentation.3
We are interested in finding the optimal loyalty program for this
heterogeneous case. It is natural to extend the single threshold in the
linear loyalty program to a n-threshold version with a progressive
bonus, as follows.
Definition 3.5. Amulti-threshold loyalty program (MTLP) is
an n-threshold linear loyalty program, where the corresponding pro-
gressive bonus for the sharing amount s ∈ [tk−1, tk ), is Bk , for B1 <
B2 < ... < Bn and thresholds 0 = t0 < t1 < t2 < ... < tn < tn+1 = 1.
Under MTLP, owner i with sharing level si ∈ [tk , tk + 1) has
utility:
Ui = fi (xi ) + psi +
k−1∑
j=1
Bj (tj+1 − tj ) + Bk (si − tk ). (9)
Here
∑k−1
j=1 Bj (tj+1 − tj ) is the aggregate bonus for sharing up to tk ,
and Bk (si − tk ) is additional bonus at rate Bk .
As in the homogeneous market case, it can be shown that the
optimal owner price is p = 0, since any p > 0 is essentially given to
users for free, when their sharing levels are below the point where
f ′i (x) = p. Thus, by using p = 0, the platform’s revenue is:
R = q
n∑
i=1
si −
n∑
i=1
[
Bki (si − tki ) +
ki−1∑
j=1
Bj (tj+1 − tj )
]
. (10)
where si ∈ [tki , tki+1 ). The first term of (10) is the income from
renters, and the second term is the bonus paid to owners.
Theorem 3.6. MTLP achieves optimal revenue among all loyalty
programs with non-decreasing marginal bonus B(s).
Theorem 3.6 is proven by showing that for any loyalty program
with a non-decreasing B(s), there exists an MTLP counterpart that
can achieve the same revenue. Therefore, it is sufficient for a plat-
form to optimize over ladder-like bonus programs with multiple
thresholds for achieving optimal revenue. This significantly reduces
the search space, and the resulting subsidy programs are also highly
practical.
Note that given p = 0 and the owner utility function in (9),
owner i’s optimal strategy (xi , si ) should guarantee that the mar-
ginal incomes of sharing and self-usage are equal. In other words,
a reasonable sharing choice for owner i should belong to the inter-
sections of the two curves, i.e., where f ′i (x) = Bj . We denote si,i−1
the sharing point of owner i at the intersection of f ′i (x) and Bi−1
(not necessarily his final choice), i.e., we have f ′i (1 − si,i−1) = Bi−1.
Below, we construct a particular MTLP and show that it is cost-
efficient. To do so, we first derive a necessary condition that any
multi-threshold loyalty program must satisfy.
Theorem 3.7. For any MTLP, we have for all i = 1, 2, ...,n that:
Bi (si − ti ) + Bi−1(ti − si,i−1) ≥
∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx . (11)
3Our results can easily be extended to the case when only owners in {i0, ..., n }
participate in the program.
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Figure 3: A multi-threshold loyalty program introduces
ladder-like bonus which rewards owners progressively.
Here owner 1 shares at the intersection point of f ′1 (1 − s1) =
f ′1 (x) = B1 and s2,1 is the intersection point where f ′2 (x) = B1.
Condition in (11) essentially means that any MTLP guarantees
that the bonus owner i receives over the interval [si,i−1, si ] should
at least cover his self-usage opportunity cost in the same interval.
Now we are ready to present a simple MTLP called Hyperbolic
Bonus (HB). The advantage of HB is that it admits an exact char-
acterization of the bonus values. The intuition beyond HB is to
tighten the subsidies to owners, by making the left hand side and
the right hand side of (11) equal for all owners. HB actually exploits
the power of differential pricing, so that owner i’s best strategy
satisfies si ∈ [ti , ti+1), i.e., each owner’s sharing level resides in one
corresponding interval. The exact form of HB is as follows.
Definition 3.8. The Hyperbolic bonus (HB) program chooses Bi
as
Bi =
q
n − i + 1 , i = 1, 2, ...,n. (12)
The corresponding thresholds {ti , i = 1, ...,n} satisfy (11) with equal-
ity, i.e., for all i ,
Bi (si − ti ) + Bi−1(ti − si,i−1) =
∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx . (13)
The existence of such ti in HB is shown in the proof of Theorem
3.6. Figure 3 shows an example of a multi-threshold loyalty program
and owners’ derivatives in the case of n = 3.
Essentially the hyperbolic bonus at each stage is inversely pro-
portional to the number of owners who earn bonus in this stage.
Under such bonus strategy, platform pays little amount of reward
for sharing levels that many owners are capable to reach. The fol-
lowing theorem shows explicitly that HB is cost-efficient.
Theorem 3.9. The amount of over-subsidization under the HB
program is upper bounded by q, i.e.,
n∑
i=1
[
Wi (sHBi ) −
∫ 1
1−sHBi
f ′i (xi )dx
]
≤ q. (14)
Here sHBi is owner i’s sharing level under HB,
∑n
i=1Wi (sHBi ) is the
overall subsidization given by HB and
∫ 1
1−sHBi f
′
i (xi )dx denotes the
opportunity cost of owner i .
Since any subsidy program has to at least cover the opportunity
costs of owners, (14) shows that HB almost does not provide any
additional subsidization, i.e., the extra payment is at most q, which
is independent of the market size n. As a platform’s profit typically
increases with n, a fixed revenue gap q also implies that our al-
gorithm is cost-efficient. Moreover, as we will show in Section 5.1,
in addition to its efficiency, HB also achieves very good revenue
performance.
4 SUBSIDIES IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET
In this section, we consider a market with two platforms, and con-
duct a comparative study on competition through loyalty programs.
In this case, let qa ,pa and qb ,pb denote the renter price and owner
reward on platform a and b, respectively. The following results
discuss only the single-threshold linear loyalty program, showing
that when facing a typical heterogeneous market with owners from
2 groups, even a single-threshold program helps company compete.
Specifically, consider two groups of owners (n = 2) in the mar-
ket, with f ′1 (x) > f ′2 (x) for x ∈ [0, 1]. Note that n = 2 is a practical
situation, e.g., users can often be categorized as active or inac-
tive [20]. We assume that demand on a platform is a function of
renter prices from both platforms, and supply is insufficient, i.e.,
D j (qa ,qb ) > |O|, j = a,b for qa ,qb ∈ [qmin ,qmax ]. Then, the
utility of owner i is:
Ui = fi (xi ) + pasia + pbsib , (15)
where sia is owner i’s sharing level on platform a, and sib is his
sharing on platform b. In the case when pa = pb , we assume that
owners will share equally on both platforms.
To demonstrate the performance of linear loyalty program, we
also introduce another widely adopted loyalty program, sign-up
bonus, for comparison. To implement a sign-up bonus, the platform
pays a one-time reward B for owners who share exclusively on
the platform, i.e., if an owner decides to share on this platform
and receives a sign-up bonus, he cannot share on other platform
simultaneously. For example, if platform a introduces sign-up bonus
and owner i joins this program, his utility will be
Ui = fi (xi ) + pasia + Ba , (16)
where Ba is the sign-up bonus from platform a. In short, sign-up
bonus is a one time payment to lock-in owners in competition.
Therefore, each platform can have three possible situations in
the following discussion: adopting no loyalty program, adopting a
linear loyalty program and adopting a sign-up bonus.
In this section, we assume that both platforms adopt the same
commission rate, i.e., βa = βb = β . The reasons why we consider
identical β are two fold. The first is that competition in real world
shows that platforms usually adopt the same commission rate, e.g.,
Uber and Lyft may vary their prices in different time and places,
but they both extract a fixed 25% commission rate. The second is
that an identical commission rate can help define the "stronger"
and "weaker" platforms in our comparison. With identical β , the
platform that charges a higher renter price q will also have a higher
owner price p ( recall that q = (1 + β)p ). We say that this platform
is "stronger" and more attractive to users than the other platform
in competition. For example, this platform may be better in service,
reputation, and efficiency in matching demand and supply, etc.,
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so that customers want to pay for its higher price. Note that the
asymmetry in customer attractions and prices are common in real
world: a less competitive manufacturer has to charge a lower price
to win customers [15], sacrificing its revenue. Naturally, we will
show how a loyalty program can help the "weaker" platform to win
market share.
4.1 Competition without loyalty program
We first provide results in a competition without loyalty programs
as a baseline. Here, there are two distinct cases to consider: (i) when
the market is symmetric (pa = pb ) and (ii) when the market is
asymmetric (pa < pb ).
Proposition 4.1. When both platforms adopt the same commis-
sion rate and neither of two platforms adopt loyalty programs, if
pa = pb , platforms will equally share the supply, i.e., Sa = Sb . Other-
wise, the platform with a lower supplier price has zero revenue.
In the symmetric case, the market is well-behaved, i.e., both plat-
forms can win some market share. In contrast, in the asymmetric
case, things are different. In particular, the asymmetric case high-
lights that market is quite fragile and, as soon as any asymmetry
exists then the market becomes “winner-take-all.” This is a common
phenomenon in two-sided markets and is a result of the fact that
more supply makes the market more desirable for demand, and vice
versa.
For our purposes, this result highlights the need for loyalty pro-
grams. A “weaker” firm (one with smaller p), must find a way to
compete in order to stay viable, and loyalty programs provide such
an opportunity. Note that we only consider the situation when
supplier price of the “stronger” firm is less than its competitor’s
demand price, i.e., if platform b is “stronger” (pb > pa ), we must
have pb < qa . Otherwise, platform a will never be able to attract
owners, since platform b is offering an owner reward even higher
than platform a’s income from renters. This condition is natural
and common in practice, since platforms do not tend to coexist if
one is extremely more efficient.
4.2 Loyalty program on one platform
The results in the case of no loyalty programs highlight the need
for a “weaker” firm to compete via the introduction of a loyalty
program. The results in this section highlight that such an ap-
proach to competition can be successful. However, our results also
highlight that there is an “arms race” underlying competition via
loyalty programs. As the “weaker” firm adopts a loyalty program,
the “stronger” firm also has incentives to adopt a loyalty program.
However, our results also highlight that consumer heterogeneity
eases the “winner take all” nature of this competition.
We denote s1a , s1b as the sharing level of owner 1 when he
choose to share on platform a or b, respectively. Denote λ = s1as1b .
We always have λ < 1, since pb > pa and owner 1 will share more
on platform b.
To begin, we first consider the case where the “weaker” firm
adopts a simple loyalty program – a sign-up bonus – in order to
compete. The following theorem highlights that this approach can
be successful.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose pa < pb < pa (1 + λβ) and βa = βb .
Further, suppose platform b does not use a loyalty program. Then,
there exists a sign-up bonus for platform a under which platform a
has a strictly positive revenue.
Our proof in appendix provides a more detailed characterization
of the exact form of the sign-up bonus and the revenue for each
platforms. We also observe in the proof that the resulting revenue
of the firms depend heavily on whether firm a tries to attract both
users, or just one user. If the owners are diverse enough, the two
firms will settle at an equilibrium where each attracts one owner
(hence, both survive in the competition). Otherwise when owners
are more alike, firm a will try to take away all users (See Fig. 7 and
Fig. 9 in Section 5.2 for experimental results).
Importantly, notice that it is not always possible for platform a
to use a sign-up bonus to compete. In fact, we see from Theorem
4.2 that if pb is very close to qa , a sign-up bonus cannot ensure
a positive revenue for platform a (see Figure 6 for experimental
result). On the other hand, the theorem also highlights that platform
a can obtain a positive revenue if pb is not too much larger than pa .
Our next result highlights that introducing the more sophisti-
cated linear loyalty program can also allow the “weaker” firm to
gain market share.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose pa < pb < qa , β1 = β2, and platform b
does not use a loyalty program. Then, there exists a linear loyalty
program (Ba , ta ) for platform a under which platform a can achieve
a positive revenue.
Interestingly, our proof highlights that the optimal linear loyalty
program to attract a specific class of owner turns out to be the same
as in the monopolistic market (see Theorem 3.2). It gives a bonus
that is equal to the platform’s commission fee, i.e.,
Ba = qa − pa . (17)
Importantly, the increased sophistication of the linear loyalty
program as compared to the sign-up bonus means that platform a
can compete even if it is much weaker, as long as pb < qa (sign-
up bonus requires pb < pa (1 + λβ)). This highlights the value of
increased sophistication.
Similar to Theorem 4.2, under a linear program, firms will also
be strategic about which owner group to attract, and the results
also depend largely on the heterogeneity of owners (See Fig. 7 and
Fig. 9 in Section 5.2 for experimental results).
4.3 Loyalty programs on both platforms
In fact the increased value of increased sophistication shows up
even more prominently when sign-up bonus and linear loyalty
programs are compared directly.
To see this, consider competition between two identical plat-
forms with different forms of loyalty programs: platform a uses
a linear loyalty program and platform b uses a sign-up bonus. In
this case, the platform using a linear loyalty program can always
squeeze out its competitor while maintaining a strictly positive
revenue.
Theorem 4.4. Suppose pa = pb = p and qa = qb = q. If platform
a adopts a linear loyalty program and platform b adopts a sign-up
bonus, then platform a can always maintain a strictly positive revenue
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while making platform b gain zero revenue, i.e., the platform with
linear loyalty program can force the competitor with sign-up bonus
out of market.
This result highlights that if one platform adopts a sophisticated
linear loyalty program, it is crucial for competing platforms to
follow suit quickly. In fact, exactly that was observed in the case of
ridesharing platforms, where both Uber and Lyft moved from sign-
up bonuses to linear loyalty programs at nearly exactly the same
time [24]. The intuition behind the fact that linear programs are
more powerful is that they boost supply by incentivizing sharing,
while sign-up bonuses only encourage participation, even under
the strong assumption of exclusiveness.
5 CASE STUDY
We conclude the paper by illustrating the results using a case study
driven by ridesharing data from Didi Chuxing. In particular, we
use data from Didi Chuxing [17] to reverse engineer the utility
functions in the model. This yields the following form:
f (x) = 1
γ
(x − x logx), (18)
where γ = 0.832. In our case study we compute the revenue and the
optimal loyalty program under different price and heterogeneity
settings, based on the user utility in (18). Note that f (x) is strictly
concave and increasing in [0, 1], with a derivative of 0 at x = 1.
5.1 Monopolistic market
We start by considering a monopolistic market and provide the
following results.
How does the supplier base payment p impact revenue?
We first demonstrate that the optimal pricing strategy for a firm is
to set the base payment p = 0 and extract revenue via the loyalty
program.
Specifically, we fix the renter charge q = 12 and consider a homo-
geneous market, which adopt the optimal linear loyalty program
derived in Theorem 3.2. Then, we vary the value p and compute
the revenue. From Figure 4, we see that the platform’s revenue is
decreasing in the supplier price p. Note that this is not obvious,
since a larger p facilitates sharing and may lead to a larger total
supply. Nonetheless, the results in Figure 4 illustrate Corollary 3.3
and shows that the platform should choose p = 0 for base payment
and rely on the loyalty program for extracting optimal revenue.
How effective is HB?We now investigate the effectiveness of
the HB program in a heterogeneous market, and show that the
revenue under HB is close to the optimal.
Specifically, we choose the self-usage utility of owner i to be:
fi (x) =
(
n − i + 1
)
· f (x), i = 1, 2, ...,n. (19)
We set the base payment top = 0 (this is the optimal case),q = 12,
and vary the number of owners n. Figure 5 shows the revenue and
platform’s total subsidy under theHyperbolic bonus program (RHB ).
It can be observed that HB achieves good revenue performance
since RHB is close to the optimal revenue ROPT . Further, we can
see that the total subsidy paid by platform is a constant beyond
the opportunity cost, i.e., the extra payment is independent of n.
This validates Theorem 3.9. Note that when n = 1, the two curves
coincide, as the market is homogeneous and the single threshold
linear loyalty program is optimal.
5.2 Competitive market
Next, we consider loyalty program under competition. In this case,
we capture the user heterogeneity with a parameter k by choosing
f2(x) = f (x) and f1(x) = k · f (x), i.e.,k being the difference between
the two classes of owners. We set pa = 10 in the experiments, and
let βa = βb = 1.
Howdoes competition impact the optimal sign-up bonus?
Consider platform a adopts sign-up bonus and platform b does not
adopt loyalty program. We first compute the optimal bonus Ba
under different competition profiles (pa ,pb )with fixedpa , and show
that user heterogeneity plays a role in deciding market partition.
Figure 6 shows the result for k = 6, where the optimal sign-up
bonus is computed for three regimes.
(i) The first regime is when pbpa < 1.5. In this regime, the sign-
up bonus is rapidly increasing in pb , and platform a’s best
strategy is to attract both owners.
(ii) In the second regime, where the competition is tougher for
platform a (a larger pb ), platform a’s optimal strategy is to
only attract owner 1 by reducing revenue. Thus, the bonus
increases in pb .
(iii) In the last regime, pb is large enough such that
pb
pa > 1.8.
In this case, platform a cannot stop owners from leaving for
platform b. As a result, it achieves zero revenue.
Howdoes competition impact the form of the optimal lin-
ear loyalty program?Wenow study the form of the optimal linear
loyalty program for platform a under different k values, while plat-
form b does not adopt loyalty program. Platform a will only attract
one owner when user heterogeneity is extensive. Figure 7 shows
the case for pa = 10 and pb = 11. There are two regimes for the
optimal linear loyalty program.
(i) If k < 7.2, platform a’s best strategy is to adopt an optimal
bonus B∗ to attract both owners and obtain higher revenue
(exact form can be found in the proof of Theorem 4.3).
(ii) If k ≥ 7.2, i.e., when users are highly heterogeneous, platform
a’s optimal strategy is to keep Ba = qa −pa , and to target only
owner 2.
The existence of transition point k ′ = 7.2 shows the watershed in
platform’s subsidy policy, i.e., when users are highly differentiated
(k > k ′), it will be too expensive to attract both owners. In that
case, platform a chooses to stay with the more profitable owner 2
and substantially increases the minimum sharing requirement to
block owner 1 from entering the platform.
Do linear loyalty programs provide a competitive advan-
tage?We now show that linear loyalty programs always lead to a
higher revenue than sign-up bonuses in the competitive setting.
Figure 8 shows the results for k = 6 and different competition
profiles (pa ,pb ) when only platform a adopts loyalty program. It
can be observed that linear loyalty program always leads to a higher
revenue than sign-up bonus. The reason is that linear bonuses can
substantially boost supply, since owners earn more bonus only
if they share more. On the other hand, sign-up bonus does not
increase the sharing amount.
Loyalty Programs in the Sharing Economy:
Optimality and Competition Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
   





Rev
enu
e
p
Figure 4: Platform’s revenue de-
creases in supplier price p under
fixed renter charge q = 12 and
optimal linear loyalty program in
Theorem 3.2. It is optimal for plat-
form to pay supplier zero base pay,
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Figure 5: Revenue under the Hyper-
bolic bonus (HB) program RHB is
close to the optimal revenue ROPT ,
and the total subsidy is a constant be-
yond opportunity cost, independent
of n (q = 12).
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Figure 6: Platform a’s optimal sign-
up bonus in three regimes: (i) attract-
ing both owners when pb/pa is small,
(ii) attracting only owner 1 when
pb/pa becomes larger, and (iii) no rev-
enue when pb/pa is large (pa = 10).
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owners when k (user heterogeneity)
is small, andwill focus only on owner
2 when k is large (pa = 10, pb = 11).
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Figure 8: Platform a’s revenue. When
only platform a adopts subsidy pro-
gram, the optimal linear loyalty pro-
gram always brings a higher revenue
than sign-up bonus (pa = 10).
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Figure 9: The critical k ′ value beyond
which platform a switches from at-
tracting both owners to only attract-
ing one owner (pa = 10).
Howdoes heterogeneity impact competition in providers?
We now move to studying the impact of supplier heterogeneity
on the optimal subsidizing policy, by finding the critical hetero-
geneity level beyond which platform a switches to attract only one
product owner. In Figure 9, we plot the critical point k ′ under dif-
ferent competition profiles (pa ,pb ) when platform a adopts linear
loyalty program and sign-up bonus, respectively.
The blue line shows the critical k ′ values of sign-up bonus. We
see that k ′ is very high (> 1000) before pb/pa < 1.4, and drops
quickly tok ′ = 6.1whenpb/pa = 1.5. Then, it continues to decrease
aspb increases. This means that sign-up bonus can win both owners
only when competitor’s price pb or user heterogeneity k is small.
The intuition behind this behavior is as follows. When pb is high,
owner 2’s sharing level at platform b will be high. Thus, if platform
a wants to attract owner 2 (the one with a smaller marginal self-
usage utility), it has to compensate owner 2’s loss due to switching
by giving a bonus that is larger than this loss. However, since pa is
not large and the sign-up bonus itself does not facilitate sharing,
attracting owner 2 is not beneficial for platform a. Hence, it will try
to instead only focus on attracting owner 1 once pb/pa is large. The
dash line shows the value of k , below which using sign-up bonus
can still gain positive revenue.
The red line shows the criticalk ′ values for linear loyalty bonuses.
Interestingly, k ′ is increasing in pb . This shows that linear loyalty
program is more likely to win both owners, even when both pb/pa
and heterogeneity increase. The reason that the critical point k ′ is
increasing is as follows. First, the bonus for platform a to attract
owner 2 is always Ba = qa − pa . Hence, if pb is high, the only way
platform a can attract owner 2 is by lowering the threshold value
ta . Moreover, the value ta decreases with pb . Thus, if pb is high,
platform already uses a small ta . In this case, it only has to pay
a smaller additional bonus to also attract owner 1 (the one with
higher marginal self-usage utility), and by doing so, it also obtains
owner 1’s sharing, which brings additional benefit. As a result,
platform a will stick to attracting both users until k ′ is higher. Note
that this implies a higher robustness of the linear program, which
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is a desired feature for platform strategies, especially at the early
stage, when a company does not have enough data to accurately
profile user behavior and heterogeneity.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider the problem of optimal loyalty program
(subsidy) design, which is central to the development of the sharing
economy. We first characterize the optimal loyalty program for a
monopolistic market with homogeneous product owners, and show
that it has a linear form that is close to loyalty programs in prac-
tice. After that, we show that the multi-threshold loyalty program
(MTLP) can achieve optimal revenue when the platform is facing
heterogeneous suppliers. Also, we introduce a hyperbolic bonus
program (HB) for the heterogeneous market, and show that this
program is highly cost-efficient and achieves a good revenue perfor-
mance. Further, we consider loyalty programs in a duopoly market
with heterogeneous suppliers, showing that the introduction of loy-
alty programs can help a weaker platform to win customers, and the
more sophisticated ladder-like loyalty program can outperform the
simple sign-up bonus. Our results show that heterogeneity in users
helps reduce the competition among platforms, since platforms
tend to attract different groups of users in this case. We further
validate our results with real transaction data from ride sharing
platform Didi Chuxing.
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7 APPENDIX: PROOFS
This section provides proofs of the results stated and discussed in
the previous sections.
7.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2
We first show that the linear loyalty program is optimal in a mo-
nopolistic market with homogeneous owners (fi (x) = f (x) for all
i ∈ O), given p and q). Since all owners are homogeneous, we can
normalize the number of owners to be 1 without loss of generality.
In this case, we have |O| = 1 and thus the total supply S = s , where
s is the owner’s sharing level. We then derive the optimal B, t . The
platform’s revenue is the commission fee subtracting subsidies, as
defined in (3):
R = (q − p)s −W (s). (20)
(i) Suppose there exists a general subsidy program B˜(s) such
that platform revenue is maximized. We want to show that there
exists a linear loyalty program with (B∗, t) that can achieve the
same revenue. Denote the sharing level of owner under B˜(s) to be
s˜ , let
B∗ = f ′(1 − s˜) − p.
Since B˜(s) maximizes R, the minimum subsidy is to compensate
owners such that the total utility would be the same whether or
not participating loyalty program B˜(s). Similarly, we can set t such
that
B∗ · (s˜ − t) =
∫ 1−s0
1−s˜
(f ′(x) − p)dx , (21)
where s0 is the sharing level when there exists no loyalty program,
which satisfies the marginal condition:
f ′(1 − s0) = p.
Since B˜(s) maximizes revenue, we should at least have s˜ ≥ s0. Note
that ∫ 1−s0
1−s˜
(f ′(x) − p)dx <(f ′(1 − s˜) − p)(s˜ − s0)
=B∗(s˜ − s0).
Here we use the marginal condition f ′(1 − s˜) = p + B. Thus there
must exists a t ∈ [s0, s˜] which satisfies (21). In conclusion, given
(B∗, t) above, owner’s sharing level and platform’s revenue are the
same as the optimal general subsidy B˜(s).
(ii) Similar to analysis above, the linear loyalty program with
parameter B, t achieves maximum revenue when:
B · (s − t) =
∫ 1−s0
1−s
(f ′(x) − p)dx . (22)
Therefore platform’s revenue is:
R = (q − p)s − B(s − t)
= (q − p)s −
∫ 1−s0
1−s
(f ′(x) − p)dx
consider first order condition,
dR
ds
= (q − p) − (f ′(1 − s) − p)
= (q − p) − B = 0,
which gives B = q − p = βp. Here we use the marginal utility
condition that f ′(1 − s) = B + p. The bonus threshold t is given by
(22):
t = s − f (1 − s0) − f (1 − s) − p(s − s0)
q − p .
7.2 Proof of Corollary 3.3
By analysis in the proof of Theorem 3.2, the maximum revenue of
platform under price p and loyalty program (B, t) is:
R(p,B) = (q − p)s − B(s − t)
= (q − p)s −
∫ 1−s0
1−s
(f ′(x) − p)dx
= qs − ps0 −
∫ 1
1−s
f ′(x)dx +
∫ 1
1−s0
f ′(x)dx ,
where s0 is the sharing level when there is no loyalty program.
Therefore it is platform’s strategy to choose supply payment p and
bonus B (which will uniquely determine t by (22)). Under first order
condition:
∂R
∂B
= q
∂s
∂B
− f ′(1 − s) ∂s
∂B
=
∂s
∂B
(q − p − B)
= 0,
which gives optimal B = q − p. Note that q is fixed and s0 is inde-
pendent of B here. Similarly,
∂R
∂p
= q
∂s
∂p
− s0 − p ∂s0
∂p
− f ′(1 − s) ∂s
∂p
+ f ′(1 − s0) ∂s0
∂p
= (q − f ′(1 − s)) ∂s
∂p
− (p − f ′(1 − s0)) ∂s0
∂p
− s0
= −s0 < 0.
The last equation is due to the fact that p = f ′(1 − s0), B = q − p
and p + B = f ′(1− s) derived above. The result shows that revenue
R is decreasing in p, which means optimal supply payment should
be p = 0, and introduces loyalty program such that :
B = q,
t = s − f (1) − f (1 − s)
q
.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Given n owners with self usage benefit fi (x), let si,0 denote the
sharing level of i under no loyalty program, i.e., f ′i (1 − si,0) = p.
Consider some owner i with sharing level si under loyalty bonus
with non-decreasing B(s), such that si > si,0, i.e, one who partic-
ipates in loyalty program B(s) and thus shares more than initial
sharing si,0 (it will be trivial if none of owners participate). We
must have the bonus covers owner i’s opportunity cost:∫ si
0
(
p + B(s)
)
ds ≥
∫ 1
1−si
fi (x)dx , (23)
and the marginal condition that fi (1 − si ) = p + B(si ).
We show that for any j > i , we must have owner j also partic-
ipates in the loyalty program. Note that p + B(si ) = f ′i (1 − si ) >
f ′j (1 − si ). If p + B(s) > f ′j (x) for all x < 1 − si , owner j must
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participate in the program and share sj ≥ si . Otherwise, there must
exists some intersection point x j such that f ′(x j ) = p + B(1 − x j )
in x j ∈ [0, 1 − si ].
Let x˜ j = max{x | f ′j (x) = p + B(1 − x),x ∈ [0, 1 − si ]}, we must
have p + B(s) > f ′j (x) for x ∈ [x˜ j , 1 − si ]. Therefore, we have:∫ 1−x˜ j
0
(
p + B(s)
)
ds
=
∫ si
0
(
p + B(s)
)
ds +
∫ 1−x˜ j
si
(
p + B(s)
)
ds
>
∫ 1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx +
∫ 1−si
x˜ j
f ′j (x)dx .
≥
∫ 1
x˜ j
f ′j (x)dx .
In this case, owner j will choose to share 1 − x˜ j to earn more from
the loyalty program.
7.4 Proof of Theorem 3.6
We prove the theorem by showing that for any subsidy program
with increasing marginal bonus, multi-threshold loyalty program
can achieve the same revenue.
Suppose under the non-decreasing marginal bonus B′(s), owner
i’s sharing level is s ′i , we must have s
′
i ≥ s ′i,0, and s ′n ≥ s ′n−1 ≥
... ≥ s ′1. By Proposition 3.4, assume owners i ≥ i0 joins the loyalty
program. If there is only one owner who joins the program, i.e.,
i0 = n, the proof is the same as in the Theorem 3.2. Otherwise,
consider owner i such that i0 < i ≤ n. There must exists some
ti ∈ (s ′i−1, s ′i ) such that:
B′(s ′i )(s ′i − ti ) + B′(s ′i−1)(ti − s ′i−1) =
∫ s ′i
s ′i−1
B′(s)ds (24)
For the case when B′(s ′i ) = B′(s ′i−1), we can choose any ti ∈(s ′i−1, s ′i ). We also have t0 ∈ (0, s ′i0 ) such that:
B′(s ′i0 )(s ′i0 − ti0 ) =
∫ s ′i0
0
B′(s)ds (25)
Construct a multi-threshold loyalty program such that Bi =
B′(si ), and threshold ti according to (24) and (25), for all i ≥ i0. In
this case, each owner i will share the same s ′i . Note the utility for i
to share s ′i stays the same in MTLP, compared to B
′(s). The reason
is that i will only choose to share at intersection points of f ′i (x)
and B(s), i.e., where f ′i (1 − s) = B(s), if any such s exists. For such
point s such that s > s ′i , and s ∈ [tk , tk+1) where k > i , we have:
Bk (s − tk ) +
k−1∑
j=i+1
Bj (tj+1 − tj ) + Bi (ti+1 − s ′i )
≤
∫ s
s ′i
B′(s)ds <
∫ 1−s ′i
1−s
(
f ′i (x) − p
)
dx
given i choose s ′i as optimal sharing under B
′(s). The first inequality
is due to the fact that Bk (s − tk ) + Bk−1(tk − s ′k−1) ≤
∫ s
s ′k−1
B′(s)ds
for s ∈ [s ′k−1, s ′k ). This means i has no motivation to over share
under MTLP B(s). Similarly, if i choose a smaller sharing level s
such that s ∈ [tk , tk+1] where k < i , we have:
Bi (s ′i − ti ) +
i−1∑
j=k+1
Bj (tj+1 − tj ) + Bk (tk+1 − s)
≥
∫ s ′i
s
B′(s)ds >
∫ 1−s
1−s ′i
(f ′i (x) − p)dx ,
which also guarantees i will not share less. The first inequality
here is due to the fact that Bk+1(s ′k+1 − tk+1) + Bk (tk+1 − s) >∫ s ′k+1
s B
′(s)ds for s ∈ [s ′k , s ′k+1).
Hence, the MTLP constructed here gives the same sharing level
of each owner, and the revenue of platform is also the same:
RB′ =
n∑
i=1
(
(q − p)s ′i −
∫ s ′i
0
B′(s)ds
)
=
n∑
i=1
(
(q − p)s ′i − Bi (s ′i − ti ) −
i−1∑
j=i0
Bj (tj+1 − tj )
)
=RMTLP .
In conclusion, for any bonus with nondecreasing marginal B′(s),
we can construct a multi-threshold loyalty program to achieve the
same revenue and sharing level, i.e., MTLP can achieve the optimal
platform revenue.
7.5 Proof of Theorem 3.7
Note that si,i−1 satisfies f ′i (1 − si,i−1) = Bi−1. If ti > si,i−1, since
owner i’s optimal sharing is si , we must have the income of sharing
si instead of si,i−1 is higher than the lost of self usage benefit from
1 − si,i−1 to 1 − si :
Bi (si − ti ) + Bi−1(ti − si,i−1) ≥
∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx ,
which is exactly (11). Otherwise if ti < si,i−1, since Bi > Bi−1 and
Bi = f
′
i (1 − si ) > f ′i (1 − s) for s < si , we always have:
Bi (si − ti ) ≥ Bi−1(si,i−1 − ti ) +
∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)d,
which also gives (11).
7.6 Proof of Theorem 3.9
From previous analysis, the bonus should at least cover owner’s
opportunity cost, and p = 0 gives the minimum opportunity cost
of owners. Note that by adding Bi−1(si,i−1 − ti−1) on both sides of
(11), we have:
Bi (si − ti ) + Bi−1(ti − ti−1)
≥
∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx + Bi−1(si,i−1 − ti−1), ∀i, (26)
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(i) According to (10), when a platform adoptsmulti-threshold loyalty
program, its revenue is:
R = q
n∑
i=1
si −
n∑
i=1
[
Bi (si − ti ) +
i−1∑
j=1
Bj (tj+1 − tj )
]
(a)≤q
n∑
i=1
si −
n∑
i=1
[ ∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx + Bi−1(si,i−1 − ti−1)
+
i−2∑
j=1
Bj (tj+1 − tj )
]
=q
n∑
i=1
si −
n∑
i=1
∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx −
n−1∑
i=1
Bi (si+1,i − ti )
−
n−2∑
i=1
(n − i − 1)Bi (ti+1 − ti )
(b)≤q
n∑
i=1
si −
n∑
i=1
∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx −
n−1∑
i=1
Bi (si+1,i − ti )
−
n−2∑
i=1
(n − i − 1)
[ ∫ 1−si+1,i
1−si+1
f ′i+1dx + Bi (si+1,i − ti ) − Bi+1(si+1 − ti+1)
]
=q
n∑
i=1
si −
n∑
i=1
∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx −
n−2∑
i=1
(n − i)Bi (si+1,i − ti )
− Bn−1(sn,n−1 − tn−1) −
n−1∑
i=2
(n − i)
∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx
+
n−1∑
i=2
(n − i)Bi (si − ti )
=q
n∑
i=1
si −
n−1∑
i=2
(n − i)
∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx −
n−2∑
i=2
(n − i)Bi (si+1,i − si )
− (n − 1)B1(s2,1 − t1) − Bn−1(sn,n−1 − sn−1) −
n∑
i=1
∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx
(c)≤q
n∑
i=1
si −
n−1∑
i=2
(n − i)
∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx −
n∑
i=1
∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx
−
n−1∑
i=1
(n − i)Bi (si+1,i − si ) − (n − 1)
∫ 1
1−s1
f ′1 (x)dx
=
n∑
i=1
[qsi − (n − i + 1)
∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx] −
n−1∑
i=1
(n − i)Bi (si+1,i − si ),
where (a) is to plug in (26) to replace the term Bi (si − ti )+Bi−1(ti −
ti−1), (b) is to plug in (26) to replace the term (n− i − 1)Bi (ti+1 − ti ),
and (c) is to plug in (26) and use (n−1)B1(s2,1−t1) = (n−1)B1(s2,1−
s1) + (n − 1)B1(s1 − t1).
Note that given (13), above (a), (b), (c) become strict equality.
(ii)Hence, given sharing level of (s1, s2, ..., sn ), the optimal rev-
enue is upper bounded by:
Rupper =
n∑
i=1
(qsi −
∫ 1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx) (27)
Now we derive the gap between RHB and RUpper , to show that HB
is almost only covering owners’ opportunity cost.
Rupper − RHB
=
n∑
i=1
(n − i + 1)
∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx +
n−1∑
i=1
(n − i)Bi (si+1,i − si )
−
n∑
i=1
[ ∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx +
∫ 1
1−si,i−1
f ′i (x)dx
]
=
n−1∑
i=1
(n − i)
[ ∫ 1−si,i−1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx + Bi (si+1,i − si )
]
−
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
1−si,i−1
f ′i (x)dx
=
n−1∑
i=1
(n − i)
[ ∫ 1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx −
∫ 1
1−si,i−1
f ′i (x)dx + Bi (si+1,i − si )
]
−
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
1−si,i−1
f ′i (x)dx
=
n−1∑
i=1
(n − i)
[ ∫ 1
1−si+1,i
min{Bi , f ′i (x)}dx −
∫ 1
1−si+1,i
f ′i+1(x)dx
]
− n
∫ 1
1−s1,0
f ′1 (x)dx +
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
1−si,i−1
f ′i (x)dx −
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
1−si,i−1
f ′i (x)dx
The last equation is becauseBi = f ′i (1−si ) ≥ f ′i (x) for x ∈ [1−si , 1],
and Bi ≤ f ′i (x) for x ∈ [1 − si+1,i , 1 − si ]. Thus,
n−1∑
i=1
(n − i)
[ ∫ 1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx + Bi (si+1,i − si )
]
=
n−1∑
i=1
(n − i)
[ ∫ 1
1−si
f ′i (x)dx +
∫ 1−si
1−si+1,i
Bidx
]
=
n−1∑
i=1
(n − i)
∫ 1
1−si+1,i
min{Bi , f ′i (x)}dx .
Continue to finish the proof, we have:
Rupper − RHB
(a)
=
n−1∑
i=1
(n − i)
[ ∫ 1
1−si+1,i
min{ q
n − i + 1 , f
′
i (x)}dx −
∫ 1
1−si+1,i
f ′i+1(x)dx
]
=
n−1∑
i=1
[ ∫ 1
1−si+1,i
min{ q(n − i)
n − i + 1 , (n − i)f
′
i (x)}dx −
∫ 1
1−si+1,i
(n − i)f ′i+1(x)dx
]
(b)
<
n−1∑
i=1
[ ∫ 1
1−si+1
min{ q(n − i)
n − i + 1 , (n − i)f
′
i (x)}dx −
∫ 1
1−si+1
(n − i − 1)f ′i+1(x)dx
]
<
n−1∑
i=1
[ ∫ 1−si
1−si+1
q
(n − i)
n − i + 1dx +
∫ 1
1−si
(n − i)f ′i (x)dx
−
∫ 1
1−si+1
(n − i − 1)f ′i+1(x)dx
]
=
n−1∑
i=1
[ ∫ 1−si
1−si+1
q
(n − i)
n − i + 1dx
]
+ (n − 1)
∫ 1
1−s1
f ′1 (x)dx
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<
n−1∑
i=1
q
(n − i)
n − i + 1 (si+1 − si ) + q
n − 1
n
s1
=
n−1∑
i=2
qsi
(
1
n − i + 1 −
1
n − i + 2
)
− qn − 1
n
s1 +
q
2sn + q
n − 1
n
s1
<q
n−1∑
i=2
[
si+1
n − (i − 1) −
si
n − (i − 2)
]
+
q
2sn
<q(sn − s2
n
) < q.
Here (a) is because of the fact that s1,0 = 0 gives
∫ 1
1−s1,0 f
′
1 (x)dx = 0,
and we also plug in the Hyperbolic pricing in (12). Inequality (b)
is because q n−in−i+1 > q
n−i−1
n−i = (n − i − 1)f ′i+1(1 − si+1) > (n − i −
1)f ′i+1(x) for x ∈ [1 − si+1, 1 − si+1,i ].
7.7 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Since pa < pb , platform a is less attractive to product owners. That
means, given owner’s utility in (15), platform a will have no supply
and hence zero revenue. Thus, it is necessary for platform a to
introduce subsidy program. Here recall that we consider exclusive
sign-up bonus, i.e., if a product owner shares at platform a, he
receives a one-time reward Ba > 0 and does not share at platform
b.
We now derive the optimal sign-up bonus for platform a. Denote
xi j , si j as the self-usage and sharing level of owner i on platform
j. Since no owner will share simultaneously on two platforms, the
utilities of owner i sharing on platform a,b, respectively, are given
by:
Uia =fi (xia ) + pasia + Ba
Uib =fi (xib ) + pbsib
Note that if owner i shares on platform j , then the following condi-
tion holds,
f ′i (xi j ) = pj , (28)
where f ′i (x) is the derivative of fi (x). Intuitively, this condition
means that the marginal income from self-usage and sharing should
be equal. Otherwise, one can allocate more resources towards the
option with higher marginal income to gain higher utility.
If platform a wants to attract owner 1, its bonus should be high
enough such that owner 1 will decide to leave platform b, even
though it offers a higher price. Thus,
U1a −U1b = (f1(x1a ) + pas1a + Ba ) − (f1(x1b ) + pbs1b )
=
∫ 1−s1a
1−s1b
f ′1 (x)dx + pas1a − pbs1b + Ba
=
∫ 1−s1a
1−s1b
(f ′1 (x) − pa )dx − (pb − pa )s1b + Ba
≥ 0.
Therefore, when bonus Ba satisfies the following inequality,
Ba ≥ (pb − pa )s1b −
∫ 1−s1a
1−s1b
(f ′1 (x) − pa )dx , (29)
owner 1 will share on platform a. In this case, the revenue of plat-
form a is
Ra = (qa − pa )s1a − Ba
≤ (qa − pa )s1a − (pb − pa )s1b +
∫ 1−s1a
1−s1b
(f ′1 (x) − pa )dx
≤ qas1a − pbs1b +
∫ 1−s1a
1−s1b
f ′1 (x)dx .
As a result, if platform a’s sign-up bonus is Ba = (pb − pa )s1b −∫ 1−s1a
1−s1b (f
′
1 (x) − pa )dx , its revenue is maximized:
R1a = qas1a − pbs1b +
∫ 1−s1a
1−s1b
f ′1 (x)dx > 0. (30)
Here R1a denotes the revenue of platform a with only owner 1 on
it. Plug in the fact that
∫ 1−s1a
1−s1b f
′
1 (x)dx > f ′1 (1 − s1a )(s1b − s1a ),
we have the inequality condition in Theorem 4.2 to guarantee a
positive revenue.
Similar to (29), if platform a wants to attract owner 2, it needs:
Ba ≥ (pb − pa )s2b −
∫ 1−s2a
1−s2b
(f ′2 (x) − pa )dx (31)
Note that the constraint (31) is tighter than (29), i.e., if (31) holds,
(29) is always satisfied. This is because
[(pb − pa )s2b −
∫ 1−s2a
1−s2b
(f ′2 (x) − pa )dx]
− [(pb − pa )s1b −
∫ 1−s1a
1−s1b
(f ′1 (x) − pa )dx]
=
∫ 1
1−s2b
(pb −max{pa , f ′2 (x)})dx −
∫ 1
1−s1b
(pb −max{pa , f ′1 (x)})dx
=
∫ 1−s1b
1−s2b
(pb −max{pa , f ′2 (x)})dx
+
∫ 1
1−s1b
(max{pa , f ′1 (x)} −max{pa , f ′2 (x)})dx
>0
Therefore, if bonus Ba is high enough such that owner 2 only
shares on platform a, owner 1 will also choose to share on platform
a. Hence, the revenue of winning both owners will be:
Rbotha = (qa − pa )(s2a + s1a ) − 2Ba
≤ (qa + pa )s2a + (qa − pa )s1a − 2pbs2b + 2
∫ 1−s2a
1−s2b
f ′2 (x)dx .
In conclusion, given the condition in Theorem 4.2, platform a can
set its bonus high enough such that (29) is satisfied to obtain a
positive revenue.
7.8 Proof of Theorem 4.3
We consider the asymmetric case here, i.e., pa < pb . That means,
platform a has a lower supplier price. In order to survive in the
competition, platform a can adopt the linear loyalty program to
boost supply. Recall the owner utility given in (5) and (15), i.e.,
Ui = fi (xi ) + pasia + pbsib + Ba (sia − ta )+ (32)
where Ba (sia − ta )+ = max(sia − ta , 0).
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Note that the reasonable bonus should be chosen such that Ba +
pa > pb . Otherwise, no owner will go to platform a and the loyalty
program simply does not work. We first show that this linear bonus
program (32) will lead to loyalty decisions.
Theorem 7.1. If platform a adopts linear loyalty program and
platform b adopts no loyalty program, we have sia · sib = 0 for all
owner i . That is, no owner will share on two platforms simultaneously.
Next we show that platform a can have positive revenue with the
introduction of loyalty program. Recall that since fi (x) is increasing
in [0, 1], we always have xi +sia +sib = 1 for all owner i . Our proof
proceeds in four steps.
Step (i): Derive the condition under which platform a at-
tracts owner 2. Since owners will only share on one platform, we
denote owner 2’s utility to be U2j when he chooses to share on
platform j. We denote s2j as owner 2’s sharing level on platform j,
and x2j as the self-usage level when owner 2 shares on platform j.
Similar to (28), we have
f ′i (xi ) = f ′i (1 − s2a ) = pa + Ba , (33)
where f ′i (x) is the derivative of fi (x). Note that the reason for
owner 2 to come to platform a must be the extra bonus. Thus, we
have ta < s2a . Now the utilities ofU2a andU2b are given by:
U2a = f2(x2a ) + pas2a + Ba (s2a − ta )
U2b = f2(x2b ) + pbs2b
Given pa +Ba > pb and that f2(x) is strictly concave and increasing
in [0, 1], we must have x2a < x2b . Due to s2j = 1 − x2j , we also
have s2a > s2b . Hence, we can rewriteU2b in the following form:
U2b = f2(x2b ) + pbs2b
= f2(x2a ) +
∫ 1−s2b
1−s2a
f ′2 (x)dx + pbs2b
= f2(x2a ) +
∫ 1−s2b
1−s2a
(f ′2 (x) − pb )dx + pbs2a
Thus, we need
U2a −U2b = (pa + Ba − pb )s2a −
∫ 1−s2b
1−s2a
(f ′2 (x) − pb )dx − Bata
≥ 0
which gives a condition:
Bata ≤ (pa + Ba − pb )s2a −
∫ 1−s2b
1−s2a
(f ′2 (x) − pb )dx (34)
Therefore, to attract owner 2, ta is upper bounded by (34) given
platform a’s bonus Ba . We verify the right hand side of (34) to be
always positive in the following:
(pa + Ba − pb )s2a −
∫ 1−s2b
1−s2a
(f ′2 (x) − pb )dx
≥(pa + Ba − pb )s2a −
∫ 1−s2b
1−s2a
(pa + Ba − pb )dx
=(pa + Ba − pb )s2b
>0. (35)
Hence it is always possible to find a feasible (Ba , ta ) pair.
Step (ii): Derive the condition under which owner 1 comes
to platform a. Suppose platform a has owner 1 on the platform.
In this case, the utilities of owner 1 on each platform are given by:
U1a = f1(x1a ) + pas1a + Ba (s1a − ta )
U1b = f1(x1b ) + pbs1b .
Similar to (34), we must have owner 1 obtaining a higher utility on
platform a than on platform b, i.e.,
Bata ≤ (pa + Ba − pb )s1a −
∫ 1−s1b
1−s1a
(f ′1 (x) − pb )dx . (36)
Similar to (35), the right hand side of (36) is always positive. Note
that the bound for Bata in (36) is tighter than that in (34) because:
[(pa + Ba − pb )s2a −
∫ 1−s2b
1−s2a
(f ′2 (x) − pb )dx]
− [(pa + Ba − pb )s1a −
∫ 1−s1b
1−s1a
(f ′2 (x) − pb )dx]
=[
∫ pa+Ba
pb
s2ady −
∫ pa+Ba
pb
(f ′−12 (y) − (1 − s2a ))dy]
− [
∫ pa+Ba
pb
s1ady −
∫ pa+Ba
pb
(f ′−11 (y) − (1 − s1a ))dy]
=
∫ pa+Ba
pb
(f ′−11 (y) − f ′−12 (y))dy
>0.
Consequently, whenever platform a has owner 1, it also has owner
2. Hence, (36) is the condition for owner 1 to join platform a.
Step (iii): Derive the optimal strategy for platform a to
maximize revenue, given that only owner 2 is on platform
a. In this case, we consider the objective of platform is to maximize
the transaction volume subtracting bonus expenditure, i.e.,
Ra = (qa − pa )s2a − Ba (s2a − ta ). (37)
Since the term Bas2a is upper bounded in (34), the revenue is also
upper bounded:
Ra = (qa − pa − Ba )s2a + Bata
≤ (qa − pa − Ba )s2a + (pa + Ba − pb )s2a −
∫ 1−s2b
1−s2a
(f ′2 (x) − pb )dx
= (qa − pb )s2a −
∫ 1−s2b
1−s2a
(f ′2 (x) − pb )dx . (38)
The revenue upper bound is achievable when
ta = t
2
a =
1
Ba
[(pa + Ba − pb )s2a −
∫ 1−s2b
1−s2a
(f ′2 (x) − pb )dx]. (39)
In order to maximize revenue, platform a will choose Ba and ta
such that:
dRa
ds2a
= 0. (40)
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Plug in (38), we have that:
dRa
ds2a
= qa − pb − f ′2 (1 − s2a ) + pb
= qa − f ′2 (1 − s2a )
= qa − (B∗a + pa )
= 0,
where the second equality derives from (33). Thus, we have the
following optimal bonus:
B2a = qa − pa . (41)
Note that under bonus in (41), the optimal revenue is
R2a = B
2
a t
2
a . (42)
One can check that when Ba = qa −pa and ta given by (39), owner
1 will not come to platform a, because,
U1a −U1b
=[pas1a + Ba (s1a − ta )] − [pbs1a +
∫ 1−s1b
1−s1a
(f ′1 (x) − pb )dx]
=[(pa + Ba − pb )s1a −
∫ 1−s1b
1−s1a
(f ′1 (x) − pb )dx]
− [(pa + Ba − pb )s2a −
∫ 1−s2b
1−s2a
(f ′2 (x) − pb )dx]
<0.
That is, the optimal bonus to attract owner 2 does not attract owner
1. In this case, platform a gets a positive revenue of R2a .
Step (iv): Derive the optimal strategy for platform a to
maximize revenue, given that it attracts both owner 1 and
owner 2. The revenue for platform a will then be:
Rbotha =(qa − pa )s1a − Ba (s1a − ta )
+ (qa − pa )s2a − Ba (s2a − ta )
≤(qa − pa − Ba )s2a + (3pa + Ba − 2pb )s1a
− 2
∫ 1−s1b
1−s1a
(f ′1 (x) − pb )dx .
Note thatRbotha = (qa−pa−Ba )s1a+(qa−pa−Ba )s2a+2Bata > 0
as long asqa−pa ≥ Ba ≥ pb−pa . Similarly, the revenue achieves the
upper bound when tbotha = 1Ba [(pa +Ba −pb )s1a −
∫ 1−s1b
1−s1a (f
′
1 (x) −
pb )dx], i.e.,
Rbotha (Ba ) =(qa − pa − Ba )s2a + (qa + pa + Ba )s1a
− 2pbs1b − 2
∫ 1−s1b
1−s1a
f ′1 (x)dx .
Taking the derivative of Rbotha (Ba ) with respect to Ba and setting
it to zero, we have:
dRbotha
dBa
=(qa − pa − Ba )(ds2a
dBa
+
ds1a
dB1
) + s1a − s2a
=0.
Thus,
B∗ = pa − s2a − s1ads2a
dBa
+
ds1a
dB1
< pa . (43)
This gives the optimal bonus to attract both owners:
Bbotha =
{
B∗ pa + B∗ > pb
pb − pa otherwise,
(44)
and the corresponding minimum service required for subsidies:
tbotha =

1
B∗ [(pa + B∗ − pb )s1a
−
∫ 1−s1b
1−s1a (f
′
1 (x) − pb )dx] pa + B∗ > pb
0 otherwise.
(45)
In conclusion, When platform a uses a linear loyalty program
and platform b does not, platform a can have strict positive revenue.
The optimal subsidizing strategy is as follow.
(1) If R2a > Rbotha (Bbotha ), platform a’s equilibrium strategy is
(Ba , ta ) = (pa , t2a ), i.e., targeting only owner 2.
(2) Otherwise, platform a sets loyalty program to be (Ba , ta ) =
(Bbotha , tbotha ), i.e., wining both owners.
7.9 Proof of Theorem 4.4
We now analyze the case when p = pa = pb and the platforms
compete using different loyalty programs, i.e., one platform adopts
the linear loyalty program and the other introduces sign-up bonus.
Let platform a use linear loyalty program with per-unit sharing
reward Ba and minimum sharing threshold ta , and let platform b
adopt a sign-up bonus Bb .
Note that in this case, for all owner i , we also have
f ′i (xia ) = p + Ba ,
f ′i (xib ) = p.
Our proof proceeds in three steps.
Step (i): Derive the conditions for platform a to have pos-
itive revenue. If platform a targets only owner 2, the utilities for
owner 2 on different platforms are given by:
U2a = f2(x2a ) + ps2a + Ba (s2a − ta )
U2b = f2(x2b ) + ps2b + Bb .
We thus need:
U2a −U2b =Ba (s2a − ta ) − Bb −
∫ 1−s2b
1−s2a
(f ′2 (x) − p)dx
≥0,
which gives an upper bound for the minimum service t2a :
Bat
2
a ≤ Bas2a − Bb −
∫ 1−s2b
1−s2a
(f ′2 (x) − p)dx . (46)
Similarly, if platform a wants to attract owner 1, we have the
following tighter condition of ta , which will imply that owner 2
also comes to the platform, i.e.,
Bat
both
a ≤ Bas1a − Bb −
∫ 1−s1b
1−s1a
(f ′1 (x) − p)dx . (47)
Step (ii): Derive the conditions for platform b to have pos-
itive revenue. The first part is to derive a lower bound of Bb for
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platform b to have owner 1. First note that the utilities for owner 1
at each platform are given by:
U1a = f1(x1a ) + Ba (s1a − ta ) + ps1a
U1b = f2(x1b ) + Bb + ps1b .
We want:
U1b −U1a
=f1(x1b ) + Bb + ps1b − f1(x1a ) − Ba (s1a − ta ) − ps1a
=
∫ 1−s1b
1−s1a
(f ′1 (x) − p)dx + Bb − Ba (s1a − ta )
≥0,
which gives a lower bound for B1b :
B1b ≥ Ba (s1a − ta ) −
∫ 1−s1b
1−s1a
(f ′1 (x) − p)dx . (48)
Similarly, the lower bound of Bb for platform b to have owner 2
will be higher, and if bonus Bb satisfies the following lower bound,
platform b will have both owners.
Bbothb ≥ Ba (s2a − ta ) −
∫ 1−s2b
1−s2a
(f ′2 (x) − p)dx . (49)
From the above, we can now show that platform b must have
Bb ≤ q−p2 (s1b + s2b ) in order to maintain positive revenue. The
reason is that if Bb >
q−p
2 (s1b +s2b ) and platform b has both owner
1 and 2, the revenue becomes
R = (q − p)(s1b + s2b ) − 2Bb
< (q − p)(s1b + s2b ) − 2 ·
q − p
2 (s1b + s2b )
= 0.
If instead platform b only has owner 1, the revenue will be:
R = (q − p)s1b − Bb
< (q − p)s1b −
q − p
2 (s1b + s2b )
< 0.
Step (iii) Derive the condition for platform a to “squeeze
out” platform b. Consider platform a’s strategy to be Ba = q − p,
and always have ta ≤ t2a , which guarantees (s2a − ta )+ = s2a − ta .
In this case, letψ denote platform b’s revenue difference between
having both owners and only owner 1.
ψ =Rbothb − R1b
=(q − p)s2b − 2
(
Ba (s2a − ta ) −
∫ 1−s2b
1−s2a
(f ′2 (x) − p)dx
)
+
(
Ba (s1a − ta )+ −
∫ 1−s1b
1−s1a
(f ′1 (x) − p)dx
)
.
That is, ifψ ≥ 0, platform b will choose a higher sign-up bonus to
win both owners. Otherwise, it will only try to attract owner 1.
If ψ ≥ 0, let platform a choose t = t2a according to (46), by
assuming the worst case that Bb =
q−p
2 (s1b + s2b ):
Bata = Bas2a − q − p2 (s1b + s2b ) −
∫ 1−s2b
1−s2a
(f ′2 (x) − p)dx . (50)
Note that the right hand side above is always positive. Thus, plat-
form a will have a positive revenue Bata . In this case, if platform b
wants to attract both owners, it needs Bb >
q−p
2 (s1b + s2b ), which
will result in a negative revenue Rbothb < 0.
On the other hand, if platform b only wants to attract owner
1, it can lower its bonus such that (48) is satisfied. Using (50), the
revenue of platform b is given by:
R1b = R
both
b −ψ ≤ 0.
Hence, if ψ ≥ 0, platform b will always have no revenue given
platform a’s strategy in (50).
Ifψ < 0, platform a can choose threshold t ′a = tbotha according
to (47) by assuming that Bb = (q − p)s1b to tighten the constraint
such that:
Bat
′
a = Bas1a − (q − p)s1b −
∫ 1−s1b
1−s1a
(f ′1 (x) − p)dx . (51)
Note that the right hand side is always positive. Thus, platform a
will have a positive revenue of Bat ′a .
In this case, if platform b only attracts owner 1, it needs Bb ≥
(q−p)s1b , which leads to negative revenue R1b = (q−p)s1b −Bb ≤ 0.
If instead platform b attracts both owners 1 and 2, it needs Bb to
satisfy (49), and the revenue becomes:
Rbothb =R
1
b +ψ < 0.
The implication is that whenψ < 0, platformb still has zero revenue
given platform a’s strategy in (51).
7.10 Proof of Theorem 7.1
Suppose there exists some owner i with strategy (xi , sia , sib ) such
that sia , sib > 0. If sia ≥ ta , we show that sharing only on platform
a is better, i.e.,
Ui (xi , sia + sib , 0) −Ui (xi , sia , sib )
=[fi (xi ) + pa (sia + sib ) + Ba (sia + sib − ta )]
− [fi (xi ) + pasia + pbsib + Ba (sia − ta )]
=(pa + Ba − pb )sib
>0.
Similarly, if sia < ta , we must have that sharing only on platform
b is better, i.e.,
Ui (xi , 0, sia + sib ) −Ui (xi , sia , sib )
=[fi (xi ) + pb (sia + sib )] − [fi (xi ) + pasia + pbsib ]
=(pb − pa )sia
>0.
Thus, owner i will never choose actions such that sia , sib > 0.
